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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL JUS COGENS
- SOME CRITICAL REMARKS
Andreas Zimmermann*
INTRODUCTION
Is it time to deny immunity to foreign sovereigns for violations of
international jus cogens? The decision of the U.S. District Court' and
the dissent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit2 in the case
of Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany seem to indicate that already,
as a matter of law, sovereign immunity should, be denied for such
violations, while Mathias Reimann3 argues elsewhere in this issue that at
least normatively this should be the appropriate solution. The following
brief remarks are an 'attempt to demonstrate that any such denial of
immunity through an amendment to U.S. statutes eliminating the grant-
ing of sovereign immunity in cases of purported violations of interna-
tional human rights4 would be both illegal under current public interna-
tional law and politically unwise. Such should be avoided.
The scope of this article, like the one to which it responds, is limit-
ed. It does not purport to resolve any question relating to the municipal
law of the United States, such as the interpretation of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act.5 Instead, it considers the problem from a purely
international law perspective. Furthermore, it does not indulge in a
complete description of attempts made by the Federal Republic of
Germany' to pay compensation - as far as feasible7 - for all the
* Max-Planck-Institute of Comparative Public and Public International Law, Heidelberg,
Germany. Dr. jur., Heidelberg (1994); LL.M., Harvard University (1989). This article repre-
sents the personal opinion of the author.
1. Princz v. F. R. G., 813 F Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992).
2. Princz v. F. R. G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
3. Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts
on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany (in this issue).
4. For the text of such a proposal see H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (relating to
jurisdictional immunities of the Federal Republic of Germany).
5. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-11 (1976).
6. Until 1990 the former German Democratic Republic denied any responsibility for the
holocaust. But see the declarations made by the first freely elected East German parliament on
April 12, 1990 and by the East German government on May 8, 1990, by which the GDR
acknowledged responsibility for the crimes of the past. See G. Schuster, Vlkerrechtliche
Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1990, 52 ZEITSCHRiFr FOR AUSLNDISCHES
6FFENTLICHEs RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 828 (1992).
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blatant human rights violations committed by Nazi Germany in the
period 1933-1945.8
THE DECISIONS IN THE PRINZ CASE AND THEIR BACKGROUND
Although one cannot but deplore the claimant's fate during the
German occupation of Czechoslovakia and the fact that several members
of his family were killed during the holocaust, there are still some points
that must be raised when considering his claim. First it is important to
note that up to now, the Federal Republic of Germany has compensated
approximately 2 million victims of the holocaust, granting on the whole
approximately $80 billion dollars. 9 It is true that - under a general
scheme agreed upon in 1953 by the state of Israel, the Jewish Claims
Conference, 10 and the Federal Republic of Germany" - the claimant
was originally precluded from compensation beause he had not previ-
ously been a resident of Germany within its borders as they stood in
1937. But one has also to take into consideration - when considering
the original exclusion of certain groups of claimants - the dramatic
economic situation of the Federal Republic of Germany at the time, only
two years after its coming into existence, still largely destroyed by the
war and flooded with refugees of German origin from Eastern Europe,
the former German territories, and from East Germany. In 1965, howev-
7. Any financial compensation scheme - whatever the amount involved - would, of
course, never be able to undo all the atrocities committed, and in any event could only serve
two main purposes: to help the surviving victims live a decent life, and to serve as a gesture
acknowledging responsibility for what has happened.
8. A detailed overview of the different compensation laws of the Federal Republic of
Germany can be found in BERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG OBER WIEDERGUTMACHUNG UND
ENTSCHXDIGUNG FOR NAZIONALSOZIALISTISCHES UNRECHT SOW1E 0BER DIE LAGE DER SINTI,
ROMA UND VERWANDTER GRUPPEN, Deutscher Bundestag, 10 Wahlperiode, Drucksache
10/6287 of October 31, 1986.
9. See, e.g., Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 44th Sess., Item 4,
ECOSOC, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993), which states: "107. The most comprehensive
and systematic precedent of reparation by a Government to groups of victims for the redress
of wrongs suffered is provided by the Federal Republic of Germany to the victims of Nazi
persecution."
10. The Jewish Claims Conference is a non-profit umbrella corporation representing 24
Jewish organizations. It was largely responsible for distributing compensation to Jewish
victims of Nazi persecution.
11. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel, 1953
BGBI.II 37; Protocol No. 1 drawn up by representatives of the Government of the FRG and
of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, 1953 BGBI.II 85; Protocol
No. 2, 1953 BGBl.II 94. The text of the protocols can also be found in the Brief for the
Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
States at 19a, Princz v. F. R. G., cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995) (No. 94-909) (on file
with the author).
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er, the respective German laws and regulations providing for compensa-
tion were amended in order to also cover claimants in a situation like
that of Hugo Princz. He accordingly became eligible for compensation
at that time. This fact and the relevant deadline of December 1969 were
widely published, and appeared in newspapers in the United States. Still,
Mr. Princz never applied for such compensation.
It is also important to note that already in 1954 the three Western
Allied Powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, and France -
concluded an agreement terminating most of their occupation rights and
settling matters arising out of the war and the occupation. 2 Chapter
Four of this treaty deals with compensation for victims of Nazi persecu-
tion. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany again acknowledged
its general obligation to compensate these victims. The treaty contains,
however, the obligation that the compensation provided by the German
authorities should be no less favorable than the one then currently
afforded by the legislation of the Liinder constrained within the United
States occupation zone. 13 The same treaty further expressly stipulated
that "the capacity to pay of the Federal Republic of Germany may be
taken into consideration in determining the time and method of compen-
sation payments ... and in providing adequate funds .... ." In this
context it is also important to note that upon the termination of all still-
existing rights of the Western Allied Powers at the time of German
reunification, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom in
1990 insisted that those provisions in the treaty dealing with compensa-
tion by the Federal Republic of Germany - including all its limitations
- should remain in force.
14
Even today the claimant still has the right to claim compensation
under existing German legislation. According to Article 2 of the Agree-
ment Implementing and Interpreting the Treaty of German Unifica-
tion, 15 the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Demo-
cratic Republic agreed to provide a fund from which victims of the Nazi
regime that had not yet received adequate compensation would be paid.
In accordance with Article 2 of the treaty, the Federal Government
12. Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation,
Oct. 23, 1954, 1955 BGBI.II 405.
13. Id. Ch. 4, para. 2, (a),(b).
14. Vereinbarung vom 27/28 September 1990 zu dem Vertrag fiber die Beziehungen
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den drei Mlchten sowie zu dem Vertrag zur
Regelung aus Krieg und Besatzung entstandener Fragen, 1990 BGBI.II 1386.
15. Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik zur DurchfUhrung und Auslegung des am 31 August 1990 in Berlin
unterzeichneten Vertrages zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik tiber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, 1990 BGBI.1I 1239.
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entered into an additional agreement with the Jewish Claims Conference,
pledging an additional $609 million to be administered by the Jewish
Claims Conference. 16 Under this scheme, Hugo Princz would be eligible
to receive a lump sum payment of $4500 plus monthly payments of
approximately $400, an offer which the claimant - unlike 70,000 other
victims among whom 19,000 are U.S. citizens - refused to accept. If
one considered, arguendo, that each and every one of those victims
would receive the $17 million Mr. Princz claims, the total amount
would be $19 billion, let alone other groups of victims which for other
reasons have not yet received compensation.
17
These arguments demonstrate that on the whole, the approach taken
by the Federal Republic of Germany does not seem to be unreasonable.
This is particularly true since the claimant - if he were successful in
obtaining the amount he sues for - would be far better off than hun-
dreds of thousands of other victims. This is supported by the fact that it
would have been economically completely unfeasible to compensate all
victims of the holocaust if one applied the standard Mr. Princz is now
claiming.
Furthermore, any such denial of immunity would "punish" the
Federal Republic of Germany for acknowledging its responsibility and
considering itself responsible for the deeds of Nazi Germany. At the
same time, other states - like the former German Democratic Republic
until 199018 - which in similar situations deny any responsibility by
arguing that as a successor state they cannot he held responsible for acts
committed by the predecessor state, which are probited under interna-
tional law.'9 But any decision to grant Mr. Princz the right to sue the
Federal Republic of Germany in United States courts, be it by way of a
court decision or an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, would not only be politically unsound, but would also run counter
to currently existing rules of public international law.
16. Agreement between the Federal Minister of Finance and the Conference on Jewish
Material Claims against Germany, Oct. 9, 1992, Brief, supra note 11, at 48-53a:
17. For the very same reasons the amounts to be awarded by the United Nations Claims
Commission, created by the Security Council to compensate victims of the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, are also comparatively small: each family cannot receive more than $10,000 in the
case of a death of a family member. See Guidelines for the conduct of the work of the
Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, 30 I.L.M. 1712, 1713
(1991).
18. See supra note 6.
19. See generally W. Czaplinski, State Succession and State Responsibility, 28 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 339 (1990); but see M. Volkovitsch, Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of
State Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts, 92 COL. L. REV. 2162 (1992).
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UPHOLDING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY EVEN IN CASES OF
VIOLATION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
Professor Reimann echoes Judge Wald's dissent to the decision of
the D.C. Circuit,2" arguing that the denial of sovereign immunity -
although normally required by customary international law2' - is legal
under current custom22 in situations like the Princz case where the
respondent government has previously violated norms of jus cogens. In
this context it must first be noted, however, that the notion of jus cogens
has been developed only after World War II and has found its most
important and significant expression in Article 53 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.23 Thus, at the time when Hugo
Princz was exposed to the abhorrent violations of his basic human
rights, it is per se impossible that these violations could at the same time
amount to a violation of' peremptory norms of international law.'
Notwithstanding this first issue, one must also cope with the prob-
lem of whether, as Reimann puts it, "jus cogens has a higher rank than
plain customary international law." 25 This argument implies a hierarchy
of norms between different rules of customary international law and thus
goes beyond the traditional concept of jus cogens as enshrined in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.26 Under both Articles 53 and
20. See Reimann, supra note 3 at n.86.
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] Introductory Note to ch. 5, subch. A ("The
immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed
principle of customary international law.")
22. As to the situation from the standpoint of the municipal law of the United States, see
Reimann, supra note 3.
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Opened for Signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Even during the preparatory work of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, some states, such as France, questioned the existence of
the notion of jus cogens.
24. This fact is acknowledged by Reimann, supra note 3 at 20, n.66; see also Judge
Ginsburg's dissent in the Princz case, where it is assumed that the notion of jus cogens
already existed in 1942. 26 F.3d at 1174.
25. Reimann, supra note 3, at 422.
26. His view is shared, however, by some leading commentators. See, e.g., by MARK W.
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1988). Janis states: "Jus cogens is
capable of invalidating not only conflicting rules drawn from treaties but also rules that would
otherwise be part of customary international law." See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102,
cmt. k. During the proceedings before the I.C.J. in the Genocide case (Bosnia-Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia [Serbia-Montenegro], Bosnia argued that the relevant resolutions of the Security
Council imposing an arms embargo violate jus cogens and are thus null and void. See Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Further Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order
of Sept. 1993), 441 (Sep. Op. Lauterpacht).
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64 of the Convention, the emergence or existence of a rule having the
character of jus cogens has the sole effect of invalidating incompatible
treaties. During the preparatory discussion of the International Law
Commission leading to the Vienna Convention, on the Law of Treaties,
no attempts were made to extend this notion to also render conflicting
rules of customary international law void. Furthermore, all the rules of
jus cogens themselves form part of customary international law. This is
so only if and to the extent that the claimed rule of jus cogens - here
the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment and punishment -
relates to the very same question as the other "regular" rules of custom-
ary international law involved - here the rules on state immunity -
can it then invalidate these other norms as being lex specialis. In our
context, while it seems to be beyond doubt that the prohibition of tor-
ture nowadays forms part of international jus cogens" it cannot be
argued that this prohibition necessarily encompasses. the further jus
cogens rule - thus overriding the general principle of state immunity
- to grant the forum state the right to deny state immunity to the
respondent state. To the contrary, it seems to be more appropriate to
consider both issues as involving two different sets of rules which do
not interact with each other. Thus, the recently proposed bill in the U.S.
Congress29 which would limit the realm of state immunity of the Federal
Republic of Germany represents a significant departure from the interna-
tionally accepted doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Upholding immunity in such cases would not leave the victims
without protection. The respective home government could exercise
diplomatic protection on their behalf and request appropriate compensa-
tion. Moreover, any limitation of state immunity as proposed by
Reimann would also be unacceptable policy-wise. This entails the clear
risk that other countries would follow the example of the United States
and modify their laws respectively. They might even go further and not
limit these exceptions to violations of jus cogens but to any kind of
human rights violation, with the result that the United States could be
sued in foreign courts for acts which the U.S. Government has taken in
27. For the work of the International Law Commission, see generally F. Vallat, Interna-
tional Law Commission, 9 ENCL. PUB. INT'L L. 183 (R. Berhnardt ed., 1986).
28. S. KADELBACH, ZWINGENDES VtiLKERRECHT 293 (1992), with further detailed
references at n.550; L. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 504 (1988); J.A. Frowein & R.
Kilhner, Drohende Folter als Asylgrund und Grenze far Auslieferung und Ausweisung,
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 537 (1983).
29. See Reimann, supra note 3, at n.77 and accompanying text.
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the United States against foreign nationals. 30 But even if one limits the
exception to violations of jus cogens, the broadness of the exception
might be dangerous since the very notion of jus cogens is both ambigu-
ous and ever more far-reaching. It is interesting to note that it was the
European Court of Human Rights which held in 1990 that an extradition
of a criminal to the United States would be illegal under Article 3 of the
European Convention of Human Rights.31 The Court argued that the
fugitive, who was facing the death penalty in Virginia, would thereby be
exposed to inhuman treatment and punishment. This example demon-
strates that even the notion of torture and inhuman treatment and pun-
ishment - which is one of the essential components of the concept of
jus cogens - is subject to different understandings and that it is accord-
ingly not advisable to let the courts of one sovereign sit in judgement on
the acts of another.
Furthermore, the United States government or other respondent
governments might be facing even worse situations, where the courts of
the forum state - unlike the ones in the United States and in other
democratic societies - do not enjoy independence but to the contrary
are de jure or de facto subject to the authority of the respective govern-
ment. In such situations the national courts might then be induced to
render judgments against the United States or other respondent govern-
ments purely according to the political situation prevailing between the
countries in question.
Finally it would be only logical and in accordance with Professor
Reimann's argument to also provide for the enforcement of any such
judgment rendered against a foreign state,32 since the claimant would be
otherwise still without compensation. This would, however, involve an
even further encroachment into the sovereign rights of the respondent
state.
To sum up, one might say that denying foreign states sovereign
immunity where a claimed violation of basic human rights is at stake -
instead of solving the conflict through negotiations or another method
for the settlement of disputes agreed upon by the parties - does not
further the ends of international law. To the contrary, such a policy
destroys the social fabric international law tends to secure, i.e. the
30. Id. 11-12.
31. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1989). See also Stephan
Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MICH-.
J. INT'L L. 845 (1990) and R. Lillich, The Soering-Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991).
32. As for the principle that foreign states are immune to the enforcement of judgments
rendered by United States courts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 25, 434, § 460.
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maintenance of international relations where states interact with each
other as sovereign nations in order to protect the rights of their citizens.
While at first glance sovereign immunity seems to be nothing more than
a pure technicality, it nevertheless enshrines a basic principle of interna-
tional law: the principle of sovereign equality of states. Granting sover-
eign immunity to foreign states also forms a necessary requirement for
states to be able to regulate their affairs among themselves as equal
partners. 33 It is one of the fundamental principles underlying the system
of as we know it without it, such intercourse would necessarily come to
an end. But any such intercourse is especially important with those
states which do commit serious violations of jus cogens, since otherwise
the international community at large would no longer be able to influ-
ence their behavior.
, Thus one cannot but express satisfaction with the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court to deny certiorari in the Princz case and thereby
uphold the international rule of law. By the same token the U.S. Con-
gress, too, should follow the advice of the U.S. State and Justice Depart-
ments34 and defeat any proposal such as that proposed last term in H.R.
934.35 Meanwhile, it might be hoped that Hugo Princz and the German
government will still be able to reach a compromise in order to finally
compensate the claimant for all the hardship he suffered more than fifty
years ago.
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 25, at 390, according to which the granting
of immunity is "necessary for the effective conduct of international intercourse and the
maintenance of friendly relations."
34. See the testimony of the representatives of the State and Justice Department before
the Subcomm.. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judiciary Comm. with
respect to S. 825, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1994).
35. For the text of such a proposal see H.R. 934, 103d Cong., '2d Sess. 1 (1994), relating
to jurisdictional immunities of the Federal Republic of Germany.
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